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Abstract 
This paper argues that agglomeration externalities are important even in the rural periphery. 
The analysis focuses on the forced relocation of more than a tenth of the Finnish population 
after World War II. Using the details of the resettlement policy to construct instrumental 
variables for wartime population growth rate, I find that an exogenous increase in 
municipality's population had a positive effect on later population growth, industrialization 
and real wages. These findings are consistent with the presence of agglomeration externalities 
and inconsistent with other popular explanations for the spatial distribution of economic 
activity.  
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1 Introduction
Ever since Marshall (1890), economists have examined whether ﬁrms and
workers become more productive when they are surrounded by other ﬁrms
and workers. Such externalities are now widely seen as the main reason for
why cities exist. In this paper, I will argue that agglomeration externalities
are important also in the rural periphery.
I start by setting up a simple model that captures the three leading ex-
planations for the spatial distribution of economic activity: the endowments
of immobile factors, random growth processes and agglomeration externali-
ties. With the help of the model, I show how migration shocks can be used
to test for the presence of agglomeration externalities. The intuition is the
following. Consider a hypothetical experiment that settles a large number of
workers into randomly chosen locations. Suppose that after the experiment,
workers start migrating from the 'control' to the 'treatment' areas. This
ﬁnding would be consistent with the agglomeration externalities explanation
and inconsistent with the immobile factors and random growth explanations.
Settling a large number of people to randomly chosen locations is, of
course, ethically and practically infeasible. Thus I exploit a natural experi-
ment that closely resembles the hypothetical experiment. After World War
II, Finland ceded its eastern parts to the Soviet Union and relocated 11 per-
cent of its population to the remaining parts of the country. The number of
displaced farmers that each rural location received was determined by the
amount of government owned land and the size distribution of private farms.
A further source of variation was created by the decision of settling virtually
no-one into the Swedish-speaking parts of the country. I use these features of
the resettlement policy to construct instrumental variables for municipality-
level population growth rate between 1939 and 1949. Under the assumption
that the instruments are valid, this allows me to examine the causal eﬀect of
a labor supply shock on later outcomes.
The plausibility of the approach is supported by the fact that the identi-
fying variation dates back to the Middle Ages. I will argue that while part of
this variation persisted, its economic rationale had vanished by the early 20th
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century due to the expansion of population, the end of the Little Ice Age,
revolution in transportation technology and the shift of the economic center
from Stockholm to St Petersburg. Furthermore, I show that the instruments
do not explain pre-war population growth rates, that the key results remain
stable when I use each instrument individually and that the exclusion re-
striction would have to be violated by a large magnitude in order to alter the
conclusions.
In line with the agglomeration externalities explanation, I ﬁnd that the
resettlement shocks increased later population growth. According to the
point estimates, a 10 percent increase in municipality's population due to the
resettlement policy caused an additional 17 percent growth during the next
ﬁve decades. This growth occurred due to increased internal migration from
other rural areas. Furthermore, the resettlement shock led to an expansion
of the non-primary sector and improved wages.
These results contribute to three branches of research. First, I add to
the growing empirical literature on agglomeration externalities. Previous
work studying war-related shocks include Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2008),
Brakman et al. (2004), Bosker et al. (2007, 2008) and Redding et al. (forth-
coming).1 All of these studies examine negative shocks on cities. In contrast,
I estimate the impact of a positive migration shock on rural locations.
The focus on rural locations is likely to matter, because agglomeration
externalities models imply that the impact of temporary shocks depends
on the initial conditions. Speciﬁcally, once a core-periphery structure has
emerged, changing the spatial conﬁguration of economic activity requires a
much larger shock than what is needed in an earlier stage of the process. My
results suggest that while the major Finnish cities were well established by
1See also Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming) and Miguel and Roland (forthcoming) on the
long-term eﬀects of war-related shocks, and Hornbeck (2009) for the economic adjustment
to an evironmental catastrophe. The broader empirical literature on agglomeration exter-
nalities includes, but is not limited to, Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ellison and Glaeser (1997,
1999), Rosenthal and Strange (2001, 2003, 2008), Rappaport and Sachs (2003), Head and
Mayer (2004a), Hanson and Xiang (2004), Duranton and Overman (2005), Hanson (2005),
Amiti and Cameron (2007), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Redding and Sturm (2008),
Combes et al. (2009), Partridge et al. (2009), Ellison et al. (2010) and Greenstone et al.
(2010). See Overman et al. (2003), Head and Mayer (2004b), Rosenthal and Strange
(2004), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) and Moretti (2010) for surveys.
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the mid-1940s, many rural locations were at the brink of becoming a local
manufacturing center. The resettlement shock was suﬃciently large to aﬀect
which of the potential equilibria materialized.
My ﬁndings also connect with the related literature on the interplay be-
tween growth, structural change and urbanization (e.g. Black and Hender-
son 1999, Caselli and Coleman 2001, Duranton 2007, Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright 2007). In particular, I complement the recent work by Bleakley and
Lin (2010) and Michaels et al. (2010), who examine the evolution and de-
terminants of population density in the United States. Unlike these studies,
however, I study the long-term eﬀects of a temporary shock.
Third, I add to the literature on the impact of large and sudden immigra-
tion ﬂows (Card, 1990; Hunt, 1992; Carrington and de Lima, 1996; Friedberg,
2001). A potential problem of these studies is that immigration into one lo-
cation may aﬀect other locations through changes in production structure
and native migration patterns (Borjas et al., 1997; Borjas, 2003). My re-
sults support the importance of such general equilibrium eﬀects. However,
in contrast to the previous empirical evidence, I ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on later
in-migration and a strong impact on production structure.2
A limitation of this study is that the research design does not allow for
distinguishing between the alternative microfoundations behind agglomera-
tion externalities. During the past two decades, an active line of research
has formalized Marshall's (1890) insight that proximity facilitates the ﬂow
of goods, people and ideas.3 My results are consistent with each of these
mechanisms, but do not measure their relative importance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up
a model and discusses a hypothetical experiment that guides the empirical
work. Section 3 discusses the resettlement in detail and Section 4 presents
the data. Section 5 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 6 reports the
2Studies on the impact of immigration on native migration patterns include Frey (1995),
Wright et al. (1997), Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001). Hanson and Slaughter
(2002), Lewis (2003) and Gandal et al. (2004) examine the impact of immigration on
production structure.
3Examples include, but are not limited to, Helsley and Strange (1990), Krugman
(1991a,b), Acemoglu (1997), Helpman (1998), Fujita et al. (1999), Glaeser (1999), Rotem-
berg and Saloner (2000) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
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results. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Test for Agglomeration Externalities
I start by drafting a model that serves two purposes. First, it provides a
simple framework that allows me to discuss some of the main insights of
the theoretical literature on agglomeration. Second, it illustrates how exoge-
nous migration ﬂows can be used as a test for the presence of agglomeration
externalities.
2.1 Assumptions
Consider an economy that consists of J locations of equal area, each endowed
with Fj units of an immobile factor and hosting Nj units of a mobile factor.
Each location can produce two ﬁnal goods, A and M . The mobile factor can
be used for production in both sectors while the immobile factor is used only
in sector A. For concreteness, I will call N workers, F the quality of land, A
agriculture and M manufacturing.
Workers are homogeneous, are paid their marginal product, can move
freely between sectors and locations, but cannot make collective migration
decisions. I abstract from labor supply decisions and assume that each worker
provides one unit of labor and that utility equals wages. Final goods are
traded in the international market, trade costs are zero and each location is
too small to aﬀect prices.
The location-level production function in agriculture is
YA = f (LA, F )
where LA is the amount of labor working in agriculture. Production in agri-
culture exhibits decreasing returns to scale: fL > 0, fF > 0, fLL < 0 and
fFF < 0, where the subscripts refer to ﬁrst and second derivates.
The location-level production function in manufacturing is
4
YM = α (LM)LM
where LM is the amount of labor working in manufacturing and α (LM) is a
productivity term.
I consider the implications of two alternative assumptions of the relation-
ship between productivity and the size of the manufacturing sector. First,
returns to scale may be constant, αL = 0, and thus productivity does not
depend on LM . Alternatively, productivity may increase with the size of the
sector, αL > 0. For instance, a larger manufacturing sector could allow for
more specialization in tasks or it might help workers to learn eﬀectively from
each other.4
2.2 The Regimes
Figure 1 illustrates the simple case where the economy consists of two lo-
cations that diﬀer from each other only in that location b is endowed with
a better quality of land than location a. In equilibrium, the supply and
demand for labor must yield identical wages in both locations. Since labor
supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, it corresponds to the size of the
population. The labor demand curvesderived in the Web Appendixare
presented by the bold lines. They are downward sloping as long as the loca-
tion fully specializes in the production of agricultural goods. Since location
b has better land than location a, a given size of a labor force corresponds to
higher wages in location b than a similar labor force in location a.
After the manufacturing sector has emerged, the shape of the labor de-
mand curve depends on whether the manufacturing exhibits constant returns
to scale (the left panel) or whether agglomeration externalities are present
(the right panel). In the former case, wages are ﬁxed at wM = α. In the
4Adam Smith's discussion about the pin factory provides a classic example on the
gains from task specialization. The learning hypothesis is typically attributed to Marshall
(1890). See Duranton and Puga (2004) and Glaeser (2008) for modern expositions of the
microfoundations of agglomeration externalities.
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latter, there is a discontinuous jump at the point where the manufacturing
sector emerges and an upward sloping labor demand curve thereafter.
The Natural Advantages Regime
I divide the parameter space of the model into three regimes that illustrate
three broad explanations for the geography of economic activity. The 'nat-
ural advantages regime' corresponds to a small aggregate labor force. For
example, if the aggregate population is N0a +N0b, the only allocation equal-
izing wages is such that N0a workers live in location a and N0b live in location
b. To see this, note that if ∆ workers move from a to b, wages at a increase
to w
′
0a and wages at b decrease to w
′
0b. As a result, workers migrate from
b to a until the regional structure returns to its initial conﬁguration. This
example illustrates a general result: the natural advantages regime has a
unique equilibrium, which is entirely determined by the endowments of the
immobile factor.
The Random Growth Regime
The 'random growth regime' takes place when the aggregate population is
large and returns to scale in manufacturing are constant. These parameter
values lead to inﬁnite number of equilibria and the only role of the immobile
factor is to determine the minimum population of each location. For example,
if the aggregate population is larger than N1a+N1b in the left panel of Figure
1, all conﬁgurations with Na > N1a and Nb > N1b equalize wages and are
thus an equilibrium. Note that they are not Pareto eﬃcient. That is, if a
suﬃcient number of workers move from a to b so that a fully specializes in
agriculture, the resulting increase in wages would beneﬁt workers at a, while
workers at b would receive the same wage as before. However, higher wages
at a would lead workers to migrate until wages are again equalized at wM .
In this regime, changes in the labor supply are absorbed entirely through
changes in the production structure. Thus it captures the intuition of the
familiar Rybczynski (1955) theorem.5 Furthermore, as temporary population
5The implications are not identical, however. In the Hecksher-Ohlin model underlying
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shocks do not aﬀect later population growth, this regime corresponds to the
'random growth' models following Simon (1955).6
The Agglomeration Externalities Regime
In the third part of the parameter space, the aggregate population is large
and productivity in manufacturing increases with the size of the sector. This
'agglomeration externalities regime' has a multiple, but a ﬁnite number of
equilibria. Within each equilibrium, natural advantages determine the re-
gional structure. However, natural advantages do not necessarily determine
which equilibrium takes place.
Consider ﬁrst the initial conﬁguration [N2a, N2b] in the right panel of
Figure 1. In this case, wages are equalized and both locations fully specialize
in agriculture. The equilibrium is stable to marginal shocks, but not to large
shocks. That is, if one worker moves from a to b, wages at b will decrease,
wages at a will increase and someone will move from b to a. However, if ∆
workers move from a to b, a manufacturing sector emerges at b and wages
jump to w
′
2b. Wages at a will also rise as there is now more land per worker.
However, given the parametrization of this example, w
′
2b > w
′
2a. Thus workers
keep on migrating in the same direction even after the initial migration ﬂow.
As a consequence, wages further increase both at a (because of decreasing
returns) and at b (because of increasing returns). At the new equilibrium,
only N
′′
2a workers stay at a while the population of b is N
′′
2b.
The agglomeration externalities regime illustrates some of the key insights
of the 'new economic geography' literature following Krugman (1991b). Par-
ticularly, it shows how increasing returns to scale in manufacturing give rise
to a regional structure consisting of a manufacturing core and an agricul-
tural periphery. It also includes the 'history matters property'. That is, if ∆
workers would have moved from b to a (instead of the other way around) at
the Rybczynski theorem, growth in one factor leads to an absolute expansion in the product
that uses that factor intensively and to an absolute contraction in the output of the product
that uses the other factor intensively (as long as the location is not fully specialized). In
the present model, land is used only in agriculture and thus the absolute size of agriculture
is not aﬀected by the size of the labor force.
6See Gabaix (1999) and Eeckhout (2004) for detailed discussion.
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the initial conﬁguration [N2a, N2b], manufacturing sector would have emerged
at a. However, if the starting point is
[
N
′′
2a, N
′′
2b
]
, the equilibrium will not
change when ∆ workers move from b to a.
A further interesting feature concerns the interaction between natural
advantages and agglomeration economies. Note that within each equilibrium
natural advantages determine the distribution of population. Furthermore,
natural advantages can determine which core-periphery equilibrium takes
place. To see this, note that if aggregate population grows steadily, the
manufacturing sector ﬁrst emerges at b. However, this is not an eﬃcient
outcome. Since location b is endowed with better land than location a, it
has a comparative advantage in specializing in agriculture. Yet, the same
comparative advantage led it to be the ﬁrst to cross the threshold for setting
up a manufacturing sector.
2.3 A Hypothetical Experiment
The simple model discussed above can incorporate all three leading explana-
tions for the geographic concentration of economic activity. I will next ask
whether a hypothetical experiment could allow researchers to empirically dis-
tinguish between these regimes. Particularly, I will think of an experiment
that randomly allocates locations a and b into a treatment and control group
and then moves ∆ workers from some outside source into the treatment lo-
cation.
Suppose that after the experiment, workers would start moving from the
control to the treatment area. This ﬁnding would be consistent with the ag-
glomeration externalities regime and inconsistent with the natural advantages
and random growth regimes. More precisely, the result would be consistent
with two situations. First, the initial distribution of workers could be close to
[N2a, N2b] in Figure 1, in which case the experiment would push the treatment
location above the threshold for the manufacturing sector to emerge. Alter-
natively, the initial conﬁguration could be something like
[
N
′′
2a, N
′′
2b
]
and, by
chance, location b would be chosen as the treatment area.
Other ﬁndings would be more diﬃcult to interpret. Suppose that after
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the experiment workers would start moving from the treatment to the con-
trol area. This result would be consistent with the natural advantages and
the agglomeration externalities regime. In the case of natural advantages,
the experiment would decrease wages in the treatment area and thus work-
ers would migrate to the control area until wages were again equalized.7 In
the agglomeration externalities regime with initial conditions at
[
N
′′
2a, N
′′
2b
]
,
this result would follow when location a was chosen as the treatment loca-
tion. That is, if the treatment location was specialized in agriculture, the
experiment would decrease wages and thus push some workers to move to
the control area.
Similarly, a ﬁnding that the treatment location grew at the same rate as
the control location would not be easy to interpret. As long as migration costs
are negligible, this ﬁnding would be consistent only with the random growth
regime. However, as I discuss in detail in Section 6.4, the ﬁnding would be
consistent with all regimes if migration costs were large. In this case, the
impact of the hypothetical experiment on equilibrium wages would provide a
test for each regime. That is, a negative wage eﬀect would be consistent only
with the natural advantages regime, a zero eﬀect with the random growth
regime and a positive eﬀect with the agglomeration externalities regime.
While understanding the implications of this hypothetical experiment
is useful for organizing thoughts, it is extremely unlikely that such an ex-
periment would be carried out in practice. However, sometimes historical
episodes resemble the hypothetical experiment. I will next discuss whether
the post-WWII population displacement in Finland qualiﬁes as such a natu-
ral experiment.
7This example illustrates the Borjas et al. (1997) critique on the 'spatial correlations'
approach used in much of the literature on the impact of immigration on native wages.
Note that the experiment would decrease wages in both the treatment and control area.
However, since wages would be equal in both area before and after the experiment, the
spatial correlations approach would lead one to conclude that wages were not aﬀected at
all.
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3 The Finnish Resettlement Policy
At the beginning of World War II, Finland was a developing country, where
half of the population worked in agriculture.8 The war led Finland to cede
over a tenth of its territory to the Soviet Union and to evacuate the en-
tire population living in these areas. The evacuation created approximately
430,000 displaced persons corresponding to 11 percent of the total popu-
lation. The most populous part of ceded areas was the region of Karelia
located in southeastern Finland, while two other ceded areas were located in
the extremely sparsely populated northern parts of the country (see Figure
2).
The plan for resettling the evacuated population was designed in three
pieces of legislation: the Rapid Resettlement Act, the Land Acquisition Act
and the Settlement Plan. Those who had derived their principal income
from agriculture in the ceded areas were entitled to receive cultivable land
in the remaining parts of country. As more than half of the labor force was
working in agriculture, this decision had a major eﬀect on the allocation
of displaced persons. The displaced farmers were not able to choose their
destination. Non-agrarian displaced persons received compensation for their
lost property in the form of government bonds and were free to choose their
destination areas.9
In total, 245,724 hectares of existing cultivated land was used for resettle-
ment and 149,675 hectares was cleared for cultivation (Laitinen, 1995). The
land was ﬁrst taken from the state, municipalities, business corporations,
church, other public bodies, land speculators and landowners not practic-
ing farming. However, 'secondary sources'private landowners who lived on
their farmsended up providing roughly half of the cultivated ﬁelds. The
land was purchased either on a voluntary basis or through expropriation using
a progressive scale presented in Figure 3. Landowners were paid a 'justiﬁ-
8According to Maddison (2010), GDP per capita was 3,589 International Geary-Khamis
1990 dollars in 1938. In comparison, Morocco, Algeria, Moldova, Jamaica, Egypt and Cuba
had similar GDP per capita in 2008.
9The only exception was the capital, Helsinki, where the housing shortages led to
direct regulation. In 1945, those who wished to move to Helsinki had to apply for speciﬁc
permission from the local housing board.
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able current local price' for the expropriated land in the form of government
bonds. However, like all capital owners, they were subject to a large capital
tax (which they could pay using these government bonds) and thus did not
receive much compensation in practice. That is, the expropriation did not
inject cash into the aﬀected municipalities. Furthermore, the aﬀected areas
were not targeted by any special regional policies. The allocation of land to
displaced farmers was completed by the end of 1948.
The amount of land available for displaced farmers within the borders of
a given municipalityand hence the number of displaced farmers allocated
to the municipalitywas primarily determined by the pre-war farm-size dis-
tribution and the amount of land owned by the public sector. Two other
factors created variation in the inﬂow of displaced persons. First, no-one
was settled in northern Finland, where the conditions for agriculture are the
least favorable. Second, Finland is a bilingual country and the Land Ac-
quisition Act included a clause demanding that the resettlement should not
alter the balance of languages within municipalities. Given that 99 percent
of the displaced farmers spoke Finnish as their mother tongue, very few of
the displaced farmers received land from the Swedish-speaking parts of the
country.
As I discuss in detail below, I will use these features of the resettlement
policy to approximate the hypothetical experiment discussed in Section 2.3.
The plausibility of this approach depends on the reasons why some locations
were endowed with larger farms, more government-owned land or a larger
Swedish-speaking population.
The origins of the identifying variation go back to the time when Finland
formed the eastern part of Sweden.10 At the time, most of the economic
activity took place in southwestern part of the country, which was well con-
nected to Stockholm by the Baltic Sea. A large fraction of the farmland,
and virtually all manors, were located in this area. Over time, population
expanded towards the east and north. A considerable number of migrants
10Swedish rule started at around mid-12th century and ended in 1809 when Finland
became part of Russia. Since 1917, Finland has been an independent country. Throughout,
'Finland' refers to the area falling within the 1939 borders. For a more detailed description
(in English) of the Finnish history, see e.g. Kirby (2006)
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from Sweden also settled along the western and southern coasts. However,
the vast area farther east and north remained a distant hinterland, where
people lived oﬀ burn-beat cultivation and hunting. These areas became state
property in the 16th century as the crown laid claim to the wilderness and
actively encouraged colonization in an attempt to increase tax revenues.
In short, the pattern of large farms in the southwest, government-owned
land in the north and east, and Swedish-speaking settlements on the coasts
was already present in the Middle Ages. This division faded over time, but
there were still clear diﬀerences in the 1940s. Figure 2 illustrates these pat-
terns. The bottom-right panel also presents the share of the displaced popu-
lation in 1948. While the proportion of displaced persons in many Swedish-
speaking municipalities on the western coast is markedly low, municipalities
elsewhere experienced up to a one-third increase in their populations. How-
ever, there was also large variation in the share of the displaced population
between neighboring municipalities in the Finnish-speaking area.
Importantly, the historical economic advantage of the southwest virtu-
ally disappeared over time. One of the reasons was the rapid population
growth and the end of the Little Ice Age, which pushed permanent settle-
ment towards the east and north.11 Another important change was the shift
of the political and economic center from Stockholm to St Petersburg in 1809
when Sweden lost Finland to Russia. Even within Finland, the capital city
was moved eastwards from Turku to Helsinki. Furthermore, transportation
technology improved substantially, particularly after the construction of an
ambitious railroad network started in 1862. While the market area of St Pe-
tersburg disappeared with the Russian revolution and the consequent Finnish
independence in 1917, the economic center remained in the Helsinki area.
11Between the mid-18th and mid-19th century, Finland experienced roughly 1.5 percent
annual population growth. The Little Ice Age refers to the period of global cooling between
the 16th and mid-19th century. While researchers do not agree on the exact timing of this
period, there is a wide consensus that conditions for agriculture in northern and eastern
parts of Finland improved substantially from the mid-18th century onwards.
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4 Data
Most of my empirical analysis is based on a dataset that I have constructed
using various Statistical Yearbooks and Agricultural Censuses published by
Statistics Finland since the 1930s. These sources provide information at
the level of the local administrative unit (municipality).12 The data are
further augmented with detailed local price indexes for 1980, an indicator
variable for a municipality being connected to the railroad network in 1939
(as documented by historical engine driver timetables, see Kotavaara et al.
forthcoming), and the number of displaced persons living in a municipality
in 1948 (from an administrative report held at the National Archieve of
Finland). In order to ensure that the spatial units remain stable over time,
I have aggregated all municipalities that either merged or dissolved between
1930 and 2000. The procedure and the data sources are discussed in detail
in the Web Appendix.
My second dataset was created by Statistics Finland and contains individual-
level longitudinal information. The starting point is a sample of the original
1950 census forms, which were manually inserted into a database. These
data were linked to the 1970 census data and 1971 tax records. Importantly,
the 1950 census forms contained retrospective questions about the munici-
pality of residence, socio-economic status and industry in 1939. Thus the
data allows for distinguishing between the displaced persons and the local
residents, who lived in the resettlement areas already in 1939. The original
sample contains information on 411,629 people from 392 municipalities (out
of a total of 547 municipalities that existed in 1950). I have access to a
random sample of roughly a quarter of these data.
In the baseline analysis, I focus on those 349 rural municipalities that
did not cede territory to the Soviet Union. Partly ceded municipalities are
excluded, since consistent time series cannot be constructed for them. The
motivation for excluding cities is that the identiﬁcation strategy relies on
12Municipalities in the baseline sample had a median land area of 417 square kilometers
and a median population of 4,273 in the year 2000. In comparison, counties in the United
States had a median land area of roughly 1,600 square kilometers and a median population
of 25,000 in the same year.
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instruments that are relevant only for rural areas. In the Web Appendix, I
show that the results are not sensitive to alternative sample selection rules.
Figure 4 plots the population growth rates between 1949 and 2000 on
the growth rates between 1939 and 1949. It reveals that some municipali-
ties experienced very large changes in their populations and that there is a
strong positive association between wartime growth rates and later growth
rates. Furthermore, while almost all rural municipalities grew during the war
and its immediate aftermath, three quarters lost population during the next
ﬁve decades. This decline was driven by emigration and, more importantly,
migration into the larger metropolitan areas.
Migration from the countryside to larger cities had already begun before
the war and it was particularly intensive in the late 1960s, early 1970s and
late 1990s. In total, the share of the Finnish population living in the baseline
sample area decreased from more than two thirds in 1930 to roughly a half in
2000.13 Despite the relative decline, however, the number of people residing
in the baseline sample area increased as the aggregate population grew. The
study area had a population density of 7.7 persons per square kilometer in
1939 and 9.1 persons per square kilometer in 2000.
5 Empirical Strategy
In Section 2, I argued that self-reinforcing population growth would provide
compelling evidence of the presence of agglomeration externalities. However,
establishing that population growth during one period causes population
growth in a later period is challenging, because confounding factors could
drive the population growth in both periods. I next discuss an empirical
strategy that exploits the features of the Finnish resettlement policy to over-
come this identiﬁcation problem.
I will take a simple approach and estimate variants of
yjt = βgjw +Xjγ + j (1)
13The calculation for 1930 excludes areas that were later ceded to the Soviet Union.
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where yjt is the outcome of interest in location j at period t, gjw is the
population growth rate between 1939 and 1949, Xj is a vector of observ-
able characteristics measured before the war, and j summarizes unobserved
factors aﬀecting the outcome. The parameter of interest is β.
The challenge in consistently estimating β is that j could also aﬀect
wartime population growth. For example, if economically more viable loca-
tions received more migrants than locations with less potential for growth,
the OLS estimates of β would be biased upwards.
I address the issue in two ways. First, I control for pre-war observ-
able characteristics and constant geographical characteristics. While these
variables may not capture all factors aﬀecting wartime population growth,
conditioning on them should reduce the potential bias.
The main identiﬁcation strategy, however, is to use an instrumental vari-
ables approach exploiting the three elements of the allocation policy discussed
in Section 3. The instruments are the proportion of a municipality's popu-
lation speaking Swedish as their mother tongue in 1930, hectares of publicly
owned land per capita in 1940, and hectares of privately owned expropri-
able agricultural land per capita as predicted by the 1930 size distribution of
privately owned land.14
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 report the results of regressing municipality-
level population growth between 1939 and 1949 on the instruments (i.e. the
ﬁrst-stage for the 2SLS estimates reported in the next section). The re-
sults are in line with the resettlement policy. A larger stock of available
agricultural land is positively associated with population growth rate during
the resettlement period. Similarly, municipalities with a large proportion
of Swedish-speaking people received fewer displaced persons and thus grew
14I approximate the available privately owned agricultural land by using the expropri-
ation scale presented in Pihkala (1952, Table II; reproduced in Figure 2) and the 1930
size distribution of privately owned land. Speciﬁcally, the instrument is constructed as
Ii39 =
n∑
s=1
(τsl h
s
l + τ
s
mh
s
m)N
s
i30/Pi39, where τ
s
l is the expropriation rate at the lower limit
of the size class s, τsm is the expropriation rate for the part exceeding the lower limit in this
bracket, hsl is the bracket's lower limit in hectares, h
s
m is the midpoint of the exceeding
part, Nsi39 is the pre-war number of farms in the municipality belonging to the bracket in
municipality i, and Pi39 is the municipality's 1939 population.
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less. Together, the instruments explain roughly a sixth of the variance in the
wartime population growth rate. The estimates are similar also in a speciﬁ-
cation controlling for pre-war municipality characteristics (second column).
The F-statistics imply that the research design does not suﬀer from problems
related to weak instruments.
The instrumental variables strategy hinges on the identifying assumptions
that the instruments had no direct eﬀect on post-war outcomes. As discussed
in Section 3, this assumption seems plausible given that the identifying vari-
ation reﬂects economic conditions in the Middle Ages and that these factors
had lost their relevance by mid-20th century. A data-driven way to assess
the plausibility of this argument is to ask whether the instruments explain
pre-war population growth. Results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table
1 suggest that they do not. The only statistically signiﬁcant association is
between the availability of privately owned land and pre-war population in a
speﬁcication where I do not control for 1930 characteristics. I return to the
potential implications of this assocation in Section 6.2.
6 Results
6.1 Population Growth
The impact of a population shock on later population growth provides ar-
guably the most powerful test for the presence of agglomeration externalities.
As discussed in detail in Section 2.3, if immobile factors determine the spatial
distribution of economic activity, a positive spurious shock in one period will
have a negative impact on the population growth of the next period. In the
random growth models, one-oﬀ population shocks will not aﬀect later popu-
lation growth at all. In a model with agglomeration externalities, population
growth during one period may have a negative or a positive eﬀect on later
population growth depending on the initial conditions.
Table 2 reports estimates for the impact of the resettlement shock on the
population growth rate in the post-war period. Each estimate stems from a
separate regression, which diﬀer in the length of the post-war period studied,
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the estimation method used and the inclusion of control variables. For ex-
ample, the ﬁrst column of panel A reports OLS (ﬁrst row) and 2SLS (second
row) estimates from regressing population growth between 1949 and 1950
on the population growth between 1939 and 1949 and a constant. Similarly,
the sixth column presents the estimates from regressing population growth
between 1949 and 2000 on population growth between 1939 and 1949 and
a constant. Panel B reports corresponding estimates after controlling for
pre-war municipality characteristics and geographical indicators.
The results suggest that the resettlement shocks increased later popula-
tion growth. According to the 2SLS point estimates reported in the sixth
column of panel B, an exogenous migration ﬂow increasing a municipality's
population by 10 percent during the war caused an additional 17 percent
population growth during the next ﬁve decades. All estimates are positive
and statistically highly signiﬁcant.
6.2 Robustness Checks
The ﬁnding that the resettlement shock increased later population growth is
consistent with the presence of agglomeration externalities and inconsistent
with the natural advantages and random growth models. However, the re-
sults could also reﬂect a failure to identify a causal eﬀect or a causal eﬀect
could follow from some other mechanism than agglomeration externalities. I
will next consider these possibilities.
Causality
A concern that the OLS estimates may be biased upwards is certainly rea-
sonable. Any unobserved factor that aﬀects population growth in the same
direction during the resettlement period and the post-war period would lead
to such a bias. While controlling for pre-war characteristics should help, con-
trolling for all relevant factors may be beyond the scope of the data. Thus
the OLS estimates alone would not provide compelling evidence on causality.
The instrumental variables estimates would be biased upwards if the land
instruments had a positive direct eﬀect on the post-war population growth or
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if the share of the Swedish-speaking population had a negative direct eﬀect.
Note that the data do not provide support for the availability of land having
a positive impact on population growth. If anything, the estimates for pre-
war population growth presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 suggest that
the land instruments were negatively associated with population growth and
would thus bias the second-stage estimates downwards. However, the point
estimates for the share of Swedish-speaking population are negative although
statistically insigniﬁcant.
In the Web Appendix, I examine the issue in detail. My main approach
in assessing the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact each
instrument aﬀects a very diﬀerent area. Particularly, large privately owned
farms were mostly located in the more prosperous southwest, while govern-
ment owned land was concentrated in the east and the north (see Figure
2). Thus it seems very unlikely that both instruments would have a direct
positive eﬀect on post-war population growth. Yet, they yield similar re-
sults when used individually. This ﬁndingtogether with a range of further
robustness checks and falsiﬁcation exercises15strongly supports the causal
interpretation of the instrumental variables results.
Alternative Mechanisms
Consider next whether a causal impact of the resettlement shock could have
be driven by other mechanisms than agglomeration externalities. The sim-
plest possibility is that the displaced population might have had higher fer-
tility or lower mortality rates. In order to assess this possibility, Table 3
examines the diﬀerences between the displaced and non-displaced popula-
tions using the individual-level Census data. Columns 1 and 2 report means
for the entire samples of the displaced and non-displaced persons. Columns
3 and 4 report similar means for a sample consisting of persons living in the
resettlement area before the war and of the displaced persons who lived in
15Speciﬁcally, I show that the exclusion restrictions would have to be violated by large
magnitude in order to change the results qualitatively, I present results using alternative
sample areas and subsamples where I gradually exclude the most inﬂuential observations
(outliers) and I report the results using various alternative modes of inference. The results
are remarkably stable across speciﬁcations.
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rural areas before the war. The comparison suggests that, if anything, the
fertility rates among the displaced population were slightly lower and mor-
tality rates slightly higher than among the non-displaced population. Thus
the post-war population growth appears to be caused by migration.16
Another potential mechanism behind the post-war population growth is
that the resettlement shock would have increased the stock of capital in the
aﬀected locations. As discussed in Section 3, the resettlement policy did not
inject cash to the aﬀected locations. Furthermore, since most of the capital
owned by the displaced persons was left in the ceded area, the resettlement
should have decreased capital-labor ratios. Thus it is very unlikely that
improvements in the relative magnitude of physical capital would explain the
results. Furthermore, the available data do not suggest that the displaced
population would have brought scarce human capital to the resettlement
areas. That is, the last three rows of Table 3 reveal that there were no
important diﬀerences in formal education or propensity to be an entrepreneur
between the displaced persons and the locals.
6.3 Production Structure
The impact of the resettlement shock on post-war population growth rate
suggests that agglomeration externalities were important in the resettlement
area. I will next ask whether also the impacts on the production structure
are in line with the agglomeration externalities regime.
Recall that in the simple model of Section 2, a population shock would
give rise to self-reinforcing population growth only if the aﬀected location was
close or above the threshold where a manufacturing sector emerges. How-
ever, this threshold is a function of location's endowments of the immobile
factorsmost of which are not observed in the data. Thus I cannot deter-
mine which municipalities were just below the threshold before experiencing
the resettlement shock. Rather, I will take an approximate approach and
regress the post-war population growth on wartime population growth, the
16Further evidence using post-war migration ﬂow data (see the Web Appendix) support
this conclusion.
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share of the labor force working in the non-primary sector before the war
and their interaction.
Table 4 reports the results. The estimates suggest that the impact of the
resettlement shock was larger among municipalities that already had some
non-primary production before the war. For example, a median wartime
population growth rate (19 percent) would increase the post-war population
growth rate by 15 percent at the ﬁrst quartile (7 percent of the labor force
working in the non-primary sector in 1939) and by 25 percent at the third
quartile (22 percent at the non-primary sector). I interpret these results to
be broadly in line with the model's predictions.
The model also predicts that the manufacturing sector should drive the
growth of the labor force. Table 5 examines this hypothesis by regressing the
post-war growth rate of the labor force working in the primary (ﬁrst row) and
the non-primary sector (second row) on the wartime population growth rate.
As expected, the growth of the labor force occurs entirely at the non-primary
sector.
6.4 Extensions
Thus far the analysis has been motivated by a highly stylized model building
on the assumption of wage equalization across locations. In a richer model,
diﬀerences in housing prices or local amenities could allow equilibrium wages
to diﬀer across regions (Rosen 1979, Roback 1982). I will next discuss the
extent to which I can assess the importance of these channels in the case of
the post-WWII Finnish population resettlement.
As in Moretti (2010), suppose that worker i in location j at time t has
an indirect utility function
Uijt = wjt − rjt + Ajt + eijt (2)
where wjt is the nominal wage rate, rjt is the housing cost, Ajt is a measure of
local amentities and eijt represents individual-level idiosyncratic preferences
for location j. A full model would also include the dynamics of the housing
market and the local amenities and deﬁne the distribution of the location-
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speciﬁc idiosyncratic preferences. In the interest of keeping the paper short,
however, I discuss the implications informally.17
Wages
I examine the impact of the resettlement shock on long-term nominal wages
using the linked census and tax register data. I restrict the analysis to indi-
viduals born between 1905 and 1939, who resided in the settlement area in
1939. I use log annual taxable income in 1971the ﬁrst period for which in-
come data is availableas the dependent variable and the population growth
rate between 1939 and 1949 in the municipality where the person lived in
1939 as the treatment variable. In addition, some speciﬁcations control for
pre-war characteristics of the individual and the characteristics of his pre-war
municipality of residence.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results. The OLS estimates reveal a posi-
tive association between the wartime population growth rate and the income
of local residents a quarter of a century later. The 2SLS estimates suggest
that ten percentage points increase in the wartime population growth rate
increased the long-term income of the locals by roughly nine percent. Given
that the average wartime growth rate in the baseline sample was 22 percent,
these estimates suggest that the resettlement policy had a substantial eﬀect
on local wages.
Interestingly, the 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates.
There are at least two potential explanations for this ﬁnding. First, it may
reﬂect the fact that the 2SLS estimator identiﬁes a weighted average of local
average treatment eﬀects (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). That is, these esti-
mates primarily capture the impacts on people living in municipalities whose
growth rates were most aﬀected by the resettlement policy. It is possible that
wages in these locations were particularly responsive to the size of the labor
force. Second, the OLS estimates may be biased downwards. This would
occur, for example, if the wartime population growth was larger in locations
where low housing prices or high local amenities compensated for (perma-
17See Moretti (2010) for full model.
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nently) low nominal wages. Unfortunately, available data do not allow me to
investigate these possibilities in detail.
Prices
The Rosen-Roback type of spatial equilibrium models suggest that the posi-
tive impact of the resettlement shock on nominal wages should be oﬀset by an
increase in local prices or a decrease in the value of local amenities. I examine
these channels by using local price index data collected in 1980.18 These data
contain information on quality-adjusted housing costs, commodity prices and
the travel cost associated with purchasing the commodities.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results for housing prices. The OLS es-
timates reveal a positive association between the population growth rate in
19391949 and housing prices in 1980. However, the magnitude of this cor-
relation is small and the 2SLS estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
These estimates suggest that the long-term supply of housing was suﬃ-
ciently elastic to accomodate the growing population. Of course, the ﬁnding
is not surprising given the abundance of land in the aﬀected locations and the
fact that housing prices are measured 35 years after the war ended. Partic-
ularly, the results do not rule out the possibility that the resettlement shock
would have increased short-term housing prices. Nevertheless, the results
suggest that the resettlement shock had a permanent positive eﬀect on real
wages.
Amenities and Migration Costs
The indirect utility function (2) provides two possible explanations for why
the resettlement shock could have permanently increased real wages. First, it
could have decreased the quality of local amenities. Second, location-speciﬁc
18These data were colleceted to determine cost-of-living adjustments determined in cen-
tralized wage negotiations. The study collected data for rents of 325,013 housing units,
management expenses of 7,052 owner-occupied housing units, prices for 9,933 apartments
and 4,466 detached houses sold in 1980, and 235,155 commodity prices from 34,503 shops.
The cost of collecting these data was considerable and thus no local price indexes have
been constructed in Finland after 1980.
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idiosyncratic preferences could create migration costs, which would prevent
wage equalizing migration ﬂows from taking place.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of the resettlement shock on local amenities.
Clearly, factors such as the climate were not altered by the displaced per-
sons. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that congestion would be an important
problem in the aﬀected locations as I examine very sparsely populated ar-
eas. In fact, the resettlement shock could have improved local consumption
amenities. Particularly, in a 'new economic geography' model building on
monopolistic competition and non-trivial transport costs, population growth
would increase the variety of brands available in a location (Krugman, 1991b;
Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003).19 Thus consumers would beneﬁt
from lower prices (due to increased competition) and from the availability of
a larger variety of products.
Panel C of Table 6 examines these eﬀects using the local price index data
for 1980. In the ﬁrst row, the dependent variable is the local commodity
price index for 317 items. For each commodity, prices were collected for the
brands that had the largest markets share in the national market. If a brand
was not available in the municipality, the price at the nearest location where
the commodity was available was used. The estimates suggest that this index
was not aﬀected by the wartime population growth.
In the next row, the dependent variable is the travel costs for purchasing
the basket of goods used for constructing the commodity price index. The
travel cost estimate was based on the distance to the nearest shop selling
each good and the typical frequencies of purchases by a commodity. The
estimates are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that shops
located in municipalities that grew fast during the war were oﬀering a wider
variety of brands in 1980.
In short, while the resettlement shock created migration responses, they
do not seem to have equalized wages net of local prices and amenities. This
ﬁnding suggests that migration costs were large. In the context of indirect
utility function (2), these cost would correspond to the location-speciﬁc id-
19See also Helpman (1998) for a discussion of the price of immobile goods in a similar
framework.
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iosyncratic preferences. Other potential sources of migration costs include,
but are not limited to, incomplete information and the direct monetary cost
of moving. However, detailed examination of these mechanisms is beyond
the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusions
I have examined the long-term impact of resettling more than a tenth of
the Finnish population after World War II. This historical episode allows for
constructing plausible instrumental variables that can be used to estimate
the causal impact of labor supply shocks on later outcomes. In line with an
agglomeration externalities modeland in contrast to other popular mod-
els explaining the spatial distribution of economic activityI ﬁnd that the
resettlement shock increased population growth, industrialization and wages.
Most of the previous empirical work on agglomeration has focused on
cities in developed countries. While these cities are clearly important en-
gines of growth and innovation, they host a relatively small share of world's
population. Thus one might hypothesize that even if agglomeration external-
ities are important in Silicon Valley or Manhattan, they might be irrelevant
in the areas where most people reside.
The results reported in this paper suggest otherwise. I focus on an area
where population density remains below ten inhabitants per square kilometer.
At the time of the resettlement, 80 percent of the population in the baseline
sample area were working in agriculture and the Finnish GDP per capita
was comparable to today's middle income developing countries. Yet, I ﬁnd
robust evidence on self-reinforcing growth. Thus I interpret these ﬁndings to
support the general importance of agglomeration externalities.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in a Two Location Example
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Note: The bold lines plot the marginal product of labor within location (y-axis) as a function of its population (x-axis). Labor supply
is assumed perfectly inelastic and thus corresponds to the size of the population. Location b is endowed with better quality of land than
location a. The downward sloping part of the labor demand curves corresponds to the 'natural advantages' regime where the aggregate
population is too small to support a manufacturing sector. The ﬂat part of the labor demand curve in the left panel corresponds to the
'random growth' regime, where where the manufacturing sector is present and exhibits constant returns to scale. The upward sloping
part of the labor demand curve in the right panel corresponds to the 'agglomeration externalities' regime, where the manufacturing
sector is present and exhibits external economies of scale.
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Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of the Instruments and the Displaced Persons
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Figure 3: Expropriation Rate for Privately Owned Agricultural Land
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Note: The scale for land expropriation for private land owners. Set by Resolution of
the Council of State in June 1945 and amended in July 1946. The size of the farm was
determined on a basis of the total area of cultivated land, cultivable meadow and open
pasture land. Farmers with two or more dependent children received some exemptions.
Source: Pihkala (1952, Table II).
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Figure 4: Wartime and Post-War Population Growth
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Note: Scatter plot and ﬁtted values from regressing the growth rate in 19492000 on the
growth rate in 19391949. Size of the dots correspond to the 1939 population.
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Table 1: The First-Stage and a Falsiﬁcation Exercise
First-Stage Falsiﬁcation Exercise
(population growth (population growth
rate 19391949) rate 19301939)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hectares of expropriable 0.24 0.24 -0.18 -0.03
land per capita (1930) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Hectares of publicly owned land 0.25 0.12 0.00 -0.18
per capita (1940) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16)
Share of Swedish-speaking -0.19 -0.16 -0.04 -0.05
population (1930) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Control variables no yes no yes
F-statistic for the instruments 21.5 17.7 2.8 1.0
Partial R2 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.01
Note: OLS estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). Sample: 349 rural municipalities.
Control variables for column 2: population growth rate between 1930 and 1939, the share of
the labor force working in the primary sector in 1930, natural logarithm of the mean taxable
income per capita in 1939, natural logarithm of the population density in 1939, natural logarithm
of the distance weighted sum of the population of all municipalities in 1939 (using the inverse
of Euclidean kilometer distance as weights), an indicator for sharing a border with a city, an
indicator for being connected to the railroad network in 1939, longitude and latitude. Control
variables for column 4: the share of the labor force in the primary sector 1930, natural logarithm
of population density in 1930, natural logarithm of distance weighted sum of the population of
all municipalities in 1930, an indicator for sharing a border with a city, longitude, and latitude.
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Table 2: The Impact on Population Growth, 19492000
Dependent variable:
Population Growth Rate between 1949 and
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Baseline
OLS 0.05 0.52 0.92 1.31 1.57 1.77
(0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19)
2SLS 0.08 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.98 1.28
(0.02) (0.14) (0.21) (0.33) (0.41) (0.49)
B: Controlling for pre-war municipality characteristics and geography
OLS 0.05 0.43 0.76 1.09 1.33 1.51
(0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20)
2SLS 0.11 0.36 0.59 0.93 1.32 1.65
(0.03) (0.15) (0.22) (0.34) (0.45) (0.54)
Note: OLS and 2SLS estimates for the population growth between 1939 and 1949
and standard errors (in parentheses). Sample, instruments and control variables: see
Table 1.
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Table 3: Comparisons of the Displaced and the Non-Displaced Populations
Full Sample Resettlement Sample
Non- Non-
Displaced Displaced Displaced Displaced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
#Children, 1950 1.57 1.53 1.73 1.61
#Children, 1970 1.35 1.26 1.48 1.34
Alive, 2002 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49
Post-primary education, 1950 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05
Entrepeneur, 1939 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: Means for displaced and non-displaced persons. Sample: 1950 and 1970 census The sample for
columns 3 and 4 includes only persons who lived in the resettlement area in 1939 war and displaced
person who lived in rural areas before the war. Farmers are not classiﬁed as an entrepreneur.
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Table 4: Interactions with Initial Conditions
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Growth Rate 0.81 0.80 0.14 0.58
between 1939 and 1949 (0.31) (0.33) (0.57) (0.66)
Labor Force Share in the 0.69 0.85 -0.78 -0.59
Non-Primary Sector, 1930 (0.34) (0.39) (0.58) (0.90)
Interaction 2.51 2.53 7.25 6.52
(0.94) (0.93) (1.87) (2.46)
Control variables no yes no yes
Note: OLS and 2SLS estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). Depen-
dent variable: Population growth rate between 1949 and 2000. Instruments:
see Table 2. Control variables: population growth between 1930 and 1939,
taxable income per capita in 1939, log population density in 1939, indicator
for being a neighbor of a city (pre-war deﬁnition), longitude, latitude, nom-
inal market access in 1939 and an indicator for being connected to railroad
network in 1939.
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Table 5: The Impact on the Production Structure, 19502000
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Sector 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Non-Primary Sector 0.21 0.23 0.41 0.62
(0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.24)
Control variables no yes no yes
Note: OLS and 2SLS estimates for the population growth rate between 1939 and
1949 and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent variables: percentage change
in the number of individuals working in primary (ﬁrst row) and non-primary (sec-
ond row) sector between 1950 and 2000. Instruments: see Table 2. Control vari-
ables: population growth between 1930 and 1939, taxable income per capita in
1939, the share of the labor force in the primary sector in 1930, population density
in 1939, indicator for being a neighbor of a city (pre-war deﬁnition), longitude,
latitude, nominal market access in 1939 and an indicator for being connected to
the railroad network in 1939.
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Table 6: The Impact on Wages, Prices and Local Amenities
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Nominal wages (1971)
log Annual Taxable Income 0.19 0.14 0.67 0.89
(0.06) (0.06) (0.18) (0.23)
B: Housing Market (1980)
Housing price index 0.07 0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
C: Consumption amenities (1980)
Commodity price index 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Travel cost associated with -0.13 -0.06 -0.27 -0.16
aquiring the CPI basket (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08)
Control variables no yes no yes
Note: OLS and 2SLS estimates for the population growth rate between 1939 and
1949. Sample (panel A): Individuals born between 1905 and 1939, who lived in the
future resettlement area in 1939. Sample (panels B and C): 349 rural municipali-
ties. Instruments: See Table 2. Individual level control variables (panel A): age, age
squared, gender, an indicator for speaking Swedish as one's mother tongue, six cate-
gories for socioeconomic status (entrepreneur, white-collar worker, blue-collar worker,
assisting family member, out of labor force) and four categories for the sector of em-
ployment (agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services). Municipality-level
control variables (all panels): see Table 1. Standard errors in panel A are clustered
at the 1939 municipality of residence level.
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